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Background: Patient awareness during general anaesthesia has considerable potential for severe
emotional distress in the patient as well as professional, personal, and financial consequences for the
anaesthetist.
Objectives: To examine the role of a previously described core algorithm ‘‘COVER ABCD–A SWIFT
CHECK’’, supplemented by a specific sub-algorithm for awareness, in the detection and management of
potential awareness in association with general anaesthesia.
Method: The potential performance of this structured approach for each of the relevant incidents among
the first 4000 reported to the Australian Incident Monitoring Study (AIMS) was compared with the actual
management as reported by the anaesthetists involved.
Results: Of the first 4000 reports received by AIMS, there were 21 incidents of patient awareness under
general anaesthesia, and 20 of patients being paralysed while awake from ‘‘syringe swaps’’ before
induction of anaesthesia. In 12 of the 21 reports there was an obvious cause, most commonly a low
concentration of volatile agent (8 of 12 reports). The AIMS ‘‘core’’ crisis management algorithm would
have detected the cause of awareness in all of these cases. In nine reports the course of anaesthesia
appeared unremarkable, and in these the algorithm would not have been expected to detect or prevent
awareness. Volatile agent monitoring would have prevented some cases of awareness, as would
bispectral index electroencephalographic (BIS) monitoring. The role of BIS monitoring is still contentious,
but it should be considered for high risk patients.
Conclusion: Awareness should be minimised by thorough checking of equipment, particularly vaporisers,
and frequent application of a structured scanning routine. Awareness may occur during crisis
management and aftermath protocols should include patient follow up to detect and manage awareness
when it occurs.
R
ecent studies have highlighted the significance of
awareness in present day anaesthetic practice. A large
prospective Scandinavian trial found a rate of awareness
of between 0.1 and 0.18%,1 and previous studies have
reported an incidence of 0.2–0.4%.2 Awareness has consider-
able potential for patient morbidity including severe emo-
tional distress and post-traumatic stress disorder.3 4 It also
has important professional, personal, and financial conse-
quences for the anaesthetist associated with this problem.5 6
Although awareness is usually perceived as an outcome after
anaesthesia, rather than an event managed in isolation, it
was thought to be useful to review awareness related
incidents reported to the Australian Incident Monitoring
Study (AIMS) in association with crisis management.
Awareness may need to be considered in the differential
diagnosis for any patient with the combination of unex-
plained sweating, tachycardia, and hypertension. In addition,
the likelihood of awareness may be increased during many
crisis situations, when anaesthesia can be inadvertently or
deliberately light.
This report builds on a previous report of AIMS incidents
related to awareness in the context of crisis management7
and also includes cases reported in a larger series of over 8000
AIMS reports.8
In 1993, a ‘‘core’’ crisis management algorithm, repre-
sented by the mnemonic COVER ABCD–A SWIFT CHECK
(the AB precedes COVER for the non-intubated patient), was
proposed as the basis for a systematic approach to any crisis
during anaesthesia where it is not immediately obvious what
should be done, or where actions taken have failed to remedy
the situation.9 This was validated against the first 2000
incidents reported to AIMS. AIMS is an ongoing study which
involves the voluntary, anonymous reporting of any unin-
tended incident which reduced, or could have reduced the
safety margin for a patient.10
It was concluded that if this algorithm had been correctly
applied, a functional diagnosis would have been reached
within 40–60 seconds in 99% of applicable incidents, and
that the learned sequence of actions recommended by
the COVER portion would have led to appropriate steps
being taken to handle the 60% of problems relevant to this
portion of the algorithm.9 However, this study also showed
that the 40% of problems represented by the remainder of
the algorithm, ABCD—A SWIFT CHECK, were not always
promptly diagnosed or appropriately managed.9–11 It was
decided that it would be useful, for these problems, to
develop a set of sub-algorithms in an easy to use crisis
management manual.12 In this work, AIMS incidents
related to awareness have been extended from those reported
in the first 2000 incidents, to those in the first 4000. This
study reports on the potential place of the COVER ABCD—A
SWIFT CHECK algorithm in the diagnosis and initial
management of actual or potential awareness, provides an
outline of a specific crisis management sub-algorithm for
these problems during general anaesthesia, and provides an
indication of the potential value of using this structured
approach.
METHODS
Of the first 4000 incidents reported to AIMS, those which
made reference to awareness were extracted and analysed for
relevance, presenting features, type of surgery, cause,
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management, and outcome. The COVER ABCD—A SWIFT
CHECK algorithm, as presented elsewhere in this set of
articles,12 was applied to each relevant report to determine the
stages at which the problem might have been diagnosed and
to confirm that activating the COVER portion would have led
to appropriate initial steps being taken. As awareness is not
completely dealt with by this algorithm, a specific sub-
algorithm was developed (see fig) and its putative effective-
ness was tested against the reports. How this was done is
described elsewhere in this set of articles.12 The potential
value of this structured approach (that is, the application of
COVER ABCD—A SWIFT CHECK to the diagnosis and initial
management of this problem, and the application of the sub-
algorithm for awareness) was assessed in the light of the
AIMS reports by comparing its potential effectiveness for
each incident with that of the actual management, as
recorded in each report.
RESULTS
Of the 130 incidents identified, 35 that used the keyword in a
sense other than to describe events related to patient
awareness during or associated with anaesthesia were
excluded. Twenty other incidents were thought to have low
potential to cause awareness under general anaesthesia and
patients were not interviewed postoperatively by the report-
ing anaesthetist. A detailed review of these incidents has not
been included in this work.
Among the remaining 75 incidents there were 21 cases of
awareness under general anaesthesia; in 34 other cases under
general anaesthesia, although there was no awareness, there
was sufficient concern about the possibility for patients to be
interviewed postoperatively to determine if it had occurred;
and in 20 cases, patients were inadvertently paralysed while
still awake by unintended administration of muscle relax-
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before induction of general anaesthesia. In 15 of these cases,
patients had unpleasant recall of being paralysed while
awake.
1. Incidents of awareness under general anaesthesia.
Details of incidents that were consistent with patient
awareness under general anaesthesia are listed in table 1.
There were nine (43%) cases of awareness in which the
conduct of anaesthesia appeared unremarkable. There were
no intraoperative presenting signs in six of these cases.
Awareness in this group was often revealed by unsolicited
postoperative patient complaints. There were two cases of
awareness during electroconvulsive therapy (ECT) that
occurred in the same session, raising the possibility of an
unrecognised drug or equipment problem.
Awareness was associated with low concentrations of
volatile agent in eight (38%) cases. In two of these this was a
deliberate choice in the management of hypotension. The
volatile agent was turned off too early in another case where
surgery was unexpectedly continued rather than completed,
and turned off accidentally in another during the manage-
ment of an intraoperative pneumothorax. One case of
awareness was caused by an empty vaporiser and three were
due to malpositioned vaporisers.
In the 12 cases of awareness other than in the group in
which the anaesthetic record appeared unremarkable, failure
to check equipment (four cases; 34%) was the most
prominent contributing factor. All four involved failure to
check vaporisers and three of the four involved malpositioned
vaporisers. These incidents outnumbered those due to
justified risk taking (two cases; 17%), faulty technique (two
cases; 17%) and inadvertent slips and lapses (two cases;
17%). Five cases (42%) were associated with crisis manage-
ment situations. Of these, two were associated with
deliberate decisions made in the management of intraopera-
tive hypotension, one was due to a slip made during the
management of a pneumothorax, and two occurred when
anaesthesia became light during difficult intubations.
If awareness had been suspected in each of these 21 cases,
the underlying cause would have been identified by COVER
ABCD in 12 (57%), with eight identified by ‘‘vaporiser’’ and
four by ‘‘drugs’’. Those that would not have been identified
were in the group in which anaesthesia appeared unremark-
able. However, it should also be noted that in about half of all
cases there were no obvious intraoperative signs alerting the
anaesthetist to the possibility of awareness. Tachycardia and/
or hypertension were mentioned as presenting signs in only
five cases (24%). The occurrence of awareness during
unremarkable anaesthesia and the apparent lack of signs to
warn of its presence—particularly lack of autonomic signs—
in such a large proportion of patients limits the likely success
of any algorithm for identifying awareness, even if volatile
agent monitoring is used.
2. Incidents under general anaesthesia with the
potential for awareness, but in which awareness was
excluded at patient follow up (n = 34).
Details of the incidents in this group are included in table 2.
In this group, incidents associated with low concentrations of
volatile anaesthetic agents were again prominent, and were
involved with 14 of 34 cases (41%). In three cases the volatile
agent was turned off deliberately because of intraoperative
hypotension. It was turned off early in one case when the
timing of the procedure’s end was misjudged, accidentally
turned off intraoperatively in two cases, and accidentally not
turned on from the start of another. Incidents with
malpositioned vaporisers were also again prominent in this
group (three cases).
Twelve (35%) of these incidents were due to slips or lapses
and 11 (32%) were due to failure to check equipment, with
five (15%) involving failure to check vaporisers.
Six incidents (18%) were associated with crisis management
situations, consisting of three cases with hypotension, one with
difficulty in ventilation, one difficult intubation and one
difficult emergency tracheostomy. Four cases (12%) presented
with intraoperative hypertension and/or tachycardia.
In all 34 of these cases patient signs or other events aroused
suspicion of patient awareness. The underlying potential cause
of awareness should have been identified by use of COVER
ABCD in at least 33 (97%) cases. In one case, a faulty vaporiser
that delivered lower than the indicated concentration was only
identified by the lack of odour in the circuit, a diagnostic
measure not mentioned in the present algorithm.
3. Incidents in which patients were accidentally
paralysed while awake.
Details of these 20 incidents are included in table 3.
Most patients had clear recall of the incident and found the
experience significantly distressing. The majority of cases
involved syringe swaps (suxamethonium/opioid) immedi-
ately before induction of anaesthesia. The true nature of what
Table 1 Incidents involving awareness under general




Unremarkable anaesthesia with no obvious
aetiology (n = 9)
Cardiac surgery. Aware at sternotomy Nil
Cardiac surgery. Aware at sternotomy Tachycardia/
hypertension
Caesarean section. Aware at incision Tachycardia/
hypertension
Burns debridement. Aware during
maintenance
Nil
Laparotomy. Aware during maintenance Diaphoresis
Minor gynaecology case. Aware when
positioned
Nil
MUA. Aware during manipulation Nil
ECT. Aware at electrode placement Nil
ECT. Aware at electrode placement Nil
Incidents related to volatile agents and
vaporisers (n = 8)
Laparotomy. Aware during maintenance
Vaporiser deliberately turned off
(hypotension)
Nil
Eye procedure. Awareness at and after
intubation. Vaporiser deliberately turned
off (hypotension)
Nil
Drainage of pilonidal abscess. Aware
during maintenance. Vaporiser turned off;
misjudgement of end of procedure
Nil
Wound debridement. Aware during
maintenance. Vaporiser accidentally turned
off during management of pneumothorax
Nil
Gynaecological procedure. Aware during
maintenance. Caused by empty vaporiser
Tachycardia
Repair of umbilical hernia. Aware during
maintenance. Malpositioned vaporiser
Hypertension, circuit leak






Miscellaneous incidents (n = 4)
Suxamethonium sensitivity in patient
intubated for cardioversion
–
Aware during difficult intubation –
Aware during difficult intubation –
Aware during intubation for respiratory
arrest, due to extravasated intravenous
access cannula
Patient movement
MUA, manipulation under anaesthesia; ECT, electroconvulsive therapy.
Awareness and anaesthesia: crisis management 3 of 6
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had occurred was not always rapidly recognised. One patient
was intubated without the use of further drugs and in
another there was a delay before the nature of the problem
was recognised, during which time the patient’s clinical state
became unstable with significant cardiac dysrhythmias.
DISCUSSION
In this, as in earlier work,7 the most frequently identified
cause of awareness under general anaesthesia was a low
concentration of volatile anaesthetic agent. The COVER
ABCD crisis management algorithm would have detected
almost all causes of awareness under general anaesthesia in
situations where it was suspected and an obvious cause
existed. This indicates that the frequent review of this
algorithm in the SCAN mode of the SCARE protocol12 should
help minimise the occurrence of awareness. The main
limitation of this algorithm, which presumably would be
shared by other clinically based algorithms, is its ineffective-
ness in patients who are aware, despite apparently unre-
markable anaesthesia and who lack physical signs to indicate
its presence. The possibility of awareness under these
circumstances underlines the value of the post-anaesthesia
follow up consultation and the importance of keeping adequate
anaesthetic records. To minimise the impact of awareness
under such circumstances, it becomes important to obtain an
adequate anaesthetic history to elicit any past history of
awareness and consider raising the issue of possible awareness
when obtaining informed patient consent, at least for patients
with such a history and in procedures where the incidence of
awareness may be higher than usual.13
When awareness is suspected intraoperatively, application
of COVER ABCD should allow for corrective action for most
obvious causes. The use of the awareness sub-algorithm
presented in the figure describes the further management
where awareness is suspected. Verbal reassurance to the
patient should be considered, as anaesthetic depth is
deepened. When circumstances are such that patient
instability makes deepening of anaesthesia difficult by more
traditional means, the use of intravenous ketamine could be
considered. The amnesic properties of intravenous benzodia-
zepines may be useful in some circumstances, but their
successful action should not be relied on, and all patients
suspected of experiencing awareness should be followed up
early to determine if it has occurred. Complaints of awareness
should be taken seriously and deserve full and frank
discussion with the patient and further follow up.
Awareness may occur during crisis management, and after-
math protocols should include its detection and manage-
ment.
The major preventable cause of awareness in AIMS
incidents to date is failure to check equipment, particularly
the vaporiser, with problems caused by malpositioned
vaporisers being particularly prominent. A thorough equip-
ment check is therefore the most important step in reducing
the incidence of awareness.
This study has also included information from incidents
that did not result in awareness under anaesthesia, but were
considered to have significant potential to do so. Incidents
related to a low concentration of volatile agent were again
prominent in this group, as were incidents that involved
failure to check equipment, including vaporisers, together
with slips and lapses. There were also two incidents related to
total intravenous anaesthesia in this group that were caused
by failure to deliver the intravenous agent to the patient.
These were not detected by the alarm systems provided with
the infusion pumps that were used. The use of total
intravenous anaesthesia should incorporate frequent checks
of drug delivery as part of a SCAN routine, preferably by
marking and checking syringe plunger travel.
Although the incidents that describe patients paralysed
while awake do not fit with the conventional perception of
awareness ‘‘under anaesthesia’’, they nevertheless involve
situations that are psychologically traumatic to patients and
have the potential to cause morbidity from respiratory and
cardiovascular instability. Although syringes should be care-
fully labelled before administration of general anaesthesia to
help avoid such incidents, many of the incidents reported
involved labelled syringes, and other strategies need to be
Table 2 Incidents with potential for awareness, where
patients were followed up (n = 34)
Details Cases Intraoperative presentation
Incidents related to volatile
agents and vaporisers
Vaporiser off. Accidental 4 Tachycardia, hypertension,
lacrimation, movement
Vaporiser off. Deliberate 3 Movement
Malpositioned vaporiser 3 Hypertension, circuit leak, patient
movement
Empty vaporiser 1 Lacrimation
Cracked vaporiser mount 1 Circuit leak
Faulty vaporiser 1 Patient movement
Patient difficult to ventilate 1 Circuit leak
Incidents related to ventilators
Leak, oxygen entrainment 3 Patient movement, oxygen
analyser
Ventilator not turned on 1 Suspicion
Incidents related to circuit leaks
Common gas outlet problem 3 Circuit leak, oxygen analyser
Leak elsewhere 1 Circuit leak
Incidents related to oxygen
flush mechanism
Oxygen flush jammed on 2 Oxygen analyser, direct
observation
Incident related to transfer of
patient from induction room to
theatre
Delay, without anaesthesia 1 Patient movement
Incidents related to total
intravenous anaesthesia
Failure to deliver anaesthetic
agent
2 Hypertension, patient movement
Miscellaneous incidents
N2O delivery failure 5 Tachycardia, hypertension
Difficult intubation 1 Suspicion
Difficult tracheostomy 1 Suspicion













Muscle relaxant/reversal, postoperative 2
Antibiotic/thiopentone 1
B Other
Residual suxamethonium in injection port flushed into
circulation with another drug given postoperatively
2
Atracurium by syringe pump, pre-induction 1
Suxamethonium mixed with fentanyl 1
Total number 20
4 of 6 Osborne, Bacon, Runciman, et al
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considered to minimise these incidents. These could include
avoidance of the use of syringes similar to those used for
relaxants for other drugs, and mental rehearsal of where
syringes are placed and the order in which they will be given.
An initiative arising from an earlier analysis of AIMS data
was making syringes with red plungers available for use with
relaxants to add an additional visual ‘‘cue’’; sales of these
have increased progressively both within Australia and
internationally.14 Early recognition of what has happened is
critical in the management of these incidents. Patients
involved should be reassured verbally and wherever possible
anaesthesia should be promptly induced, before any further
substantial intervention—particularly intubation—is under-
taken. Patients should be followed up and those with recall of
the incident should be provided with an explanation of what
happened and should be offered further follow up.
In conclusion, awareness under anaesthesia may occur
despite apparently sound anaesthetic management and the
lack of physical signs. In these circumstances, no algorithm
can be expected to reliably detect or prevent awareness.
When awareness is actually suspected, the use of COVER
ABCD should reliably detect most obvious causes of aware-
ness, provided that in the absence of a volatile agent monitor,
the odour of the anaesthetic gases in the circuit is checked to
exclude a significantly lower volatile agent concentration
than expected. The incidence of awareness under anaesthesia
should be reduced by careful checking of equipment,
particularly vaporisers and the intraoperative use of the
SCAN level of COVER ABCD. Awareness may occur during
crisis management and this should be considered after crisis
resolution. Aftermath protocols should include its detection
and treatment. As previously stated, AIMS incidents suggest
that the inadvertent paralysis of patients while awake is a
significant cause of patient trauma that could be reduced by
measures such as syringe labelling, together with other
methods of clearly identifying syringes used for relaxants,
and mental rehearsal of the positions of all syringes and the
order in which they will be used. In countries in which they
can be afforded, integrated drug administration systems,15 16
online volatile agent recognition and monitoring, and depth
of anaesthesia monitors (for example, BIS monitoring and
auditory evoked potentials) should prevent most cases of
awareness. However, the cost-benefit of monitors may well
be out of the range of even the best resourced hospital
systems for use in all routine cases, especially as they appear
not to prevent all cases of awareness.17–19 Perhaps meticulous
attention should be paid to all the other measures described
above, and BIS monitoring should be referred for higher risk
patients.
Finally, it is important that a full explanation of what
happened be given to the patient, that the event be
documented in the anaesthetic record, and, if appropriate,
that the patient be given a letter to warn future anaesthetists.
If a particular precipitating event was significant, or a
particular action was useful in resolving the crisis, this
should be clearly explained and documented.
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Key messages
N Of the first 4000 incident reports to the AIMS there
were 21 instances of patient awareness under general
anaesthesia, 34 other cases where a postoperative
interview was conducted to determine if it had
occurred, and 20 more cases where patients were
inadvertently paralysed while still awake due to
unintended muscle relaxant administration.
N In nine of the 21 awareness cases there were no
warning signs either before or during anaesthesia.
N In the remaining 12, failure to check equipment (34%)
was the commonest contributing factor.
N In eight of the 21 cases the problem was too low a
concentration of volatile agent being delivered from the
vaporiser (low or off setting, empty or malpositioned).
N Of the remaining four cases, three were aware during
endotracheal intubation.
N COVER ABCD would have identified the underlying
cause in 12 of the 21 cases, if awareness had been
suspected in all.
N In the 34 ‘‘possible awareness’’ cases, the causes most
commonly involved vaporisers (13 cases), ventilators
(four cases), circuit leaks (four cases), and oxygen flush
problems (two cases).
N Twelve of the 34 cases (35%) were due to slips or
lapses and 11 (32%) failure to check equipment.
N In six (18%) of these cases the awareness was
associated with crisis management (three hypotension,
one difficult ventilation, one difficult intubation, one
difficult emergency tracheostomy).
N Most of the 20 ‘‘paralysed while awake’’ cases were
the result of a ‘‘syringe swap’’ before induction of
general anaesthesia. Most of these patients had clear
recall and were significantly distressed.
N In this series the commonest identifiable cause was low
concentration of volatile anaesthetic agent and the
major preventable cause in AIMS is failure to check
equipment.
N COVER ABCD algorithm followed by the awareness
sub-algorithm should reliably detect most causes in any
suspected awareness.
N Volatile agent monitoring, integrated drug administra-
tion systems, and the use of bispectral index electro-
encephalographic (BIS) monitoring in high risk patients
is recommended.
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